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Abstract 
 
With the onset of the Great Depression in 1929 and the 1931 Manchurian Incident, 
Japanese intellectuals and business leaders appealed to the language of self-
determination and Pan-Asianism to advocate for domestic reform and imperial 
expansion. At the same time, Indian nationalists in Japan, such as Rash Behari Bose, 
Anand Mohan Sahay, Aiyappan-Pillai Madhavan Nair, and others, viewed the creation of 
Manchukuo in 1932 as evidence of Japanese sincerity toward Asian nationalism, as well 
as a model of development that India and Asia should follow. These invocations were 
used to legitimize their own nation-building projects and critique trends within the 
mainstream Indian nationalist movement. This article analyzes the encounters between 
Japan, India, and the Indian merchant diaspora in East Asia from 1931 to 1938. The 
author argues that Japanese Pan-Asianists as well as some Indian nationalists sought to 
legitimize their own national and transnational projects during this period by appealing 
to a common Asian civilization that was mediated through a politics of comparison and 
deflection. The article also demonstrates that comparisons often occluded the issue of 
imperial violence and revealed the limitations of accepting nationalism and the nation-
state as the foundation of civilizational discourse and transnational community.  
 
Keywords: Pan-Asianism, Japan, India, Indian diaspora, Manchukuo, politics of 
comparison, Rash Behari Bose, Anand Mohan Sahay, Aiyappan-Pillai Madhavan Nair, 
Mahendra Pratap, Ōkawa Shūmei, Nakatani Takeyo, Indian merchants, Kobe, Yokohama, 
nationalism, imperialism, political economy, comparative colonialism 
 
Introduction 
 
In the wake of the Great Depression, Japan sought to both protect and expand its 
imperial interests in Asia by appealing to Pan-Asianism and the language of self-
determination. The protectionist measures that many countries adopted after 1929 
crippled Japan’s export-based economy. Simultaneously, Japanese policymakers and 
military leaders feared that the dual threats of Guomindang China and the Soviet Union 
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expanding into Manchuria would threaten Japanese investments in the region and its 
overall position in Asia at a time when Japan was in an economic crisis. Amid these fears 
and uncertainties, the Kwantung Army moved beyond its namesake peninsular garrison 
and the South Manchuria Railway Zone and invaded Manchuria in September 1931 
during what became known as the Manchurian Incident. By February 1932, Manchuria 
was declared independent and renamed Manchukuo, a nominally sovereign and 
independent nation-state with the former Qing Emperor Puyi reigning as a 
constitutional monarch. 
There is now an abundance of literature on Manchukuo and its significance in the 
history of the Japanese Empire and of Northeast Asia broadly. From studies that 
highlight popular support for Manchukuo and its influence in formulating policy within 
the Japanese metropole to scholarship that seeks to understand how Pan-Asianist 
ideology was used to buttress and ascribe legitimacy to Japan’s client state, the work of 
scholars such as Mark Driscoll (2010), Prasenjit Duara (2003), and Louise Young (1998) 
have moved beyond earlier scholarship that merely dismissed Manchukuo as a puppet-
state. These newer studies recognized the very real exploitation that occurred during 
Manchukuo’s thirteen-year lifespan despite its utopian promises. The significance of 
Manchukuo lies not only in inaugurating a new phase of Japanese imperialism and the 
simultaneous transformation of Japanese society along fascist lines but also in 
underscoring how Japanese policymakers, bureaucrats, business leaders, intellectuals, 
and religious activists sought to refashion Japan’s image as the champion of the 
colonized world in its rivalries with competing nationalisms and imperialisms. 
However, if Manchukuo was celebrated by Japanese Pan-Asianists as the 
inauguration of a new order that promised the overthrow of Western imperialism and 
would usher Asia into an era of peace and modernity, what did leaders in various parts 
of the colonized world make of such claims? Moreover, what were the linkages between 
culturalist invocations of Pan-Asian unity and the economic imperatives of Japanese 
imperialism during the 1930s? Masataka Matsuura’s work highlights the political 
economy of Pan-Asianism during this period as Japan sought to expand its economic 
position in Asia in competition with other imperial powers in the region. Devoting a 
section to Indian nationalists in Japan in his 2010 book, “Dai Tōa sensō” wa naze okita 
no ka? Han-Ajiashugi no seijikeizaishi (Why did the “Greater East Asia War” occur? A 
political and economic history of Pan-Asianism), Matsuura places the activities of Indian 
nationalists such as Rash Behari Bose, Anand Mohan Sahay, Mahendra Pratap, and 
Aiyappan-Pillai Madhavan Nair in the political economy of Japanese imperialism in the 
interwar years and masterfully explicates the triangular relationship among Indian 
nationalist activists, Japanese business associations, and Buddhist leaders. This 
relationship was especially important for Japanese policymakers and business owners as 
Japan began to lose Chinese merchant support during the 1920s and 1930s and sought 
to cultivate economic links with the extensive Indian merchant networks in East and 
Southeast Asia (Matsuura 2010, 234–272).  
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Some scholarly attention has focused on the career of Rash Behari Bose, a Bengali 
revolutionary who fled to Tokyo in 1915 due to his involvement in an assassination 
attempt on the British Viceroy and became the face of Indian nationalism in Japan 
through his involvement with Pan-Asianist leaders and organizations such as Tōyama 
Mitsuru of Gen’yōsha 玄洋社 (Dark ocean society). Takeshi Nakajima’s biography of 
Bose, translated by Prem Motwani, remains the most comprehensive account of Bose’s 
life available in the English language. However, it is limited by Nakajima’s hagiographical 
portrayal of Bose, which hinders his analysis when discussing Bose’s problematic views 
regarding Japanese imperialism and Hindu nationalism (Nakajima 2009).  
More recently, Joseph McQuade makes the important observation that Bose’s 
activities in Japan and his championing of a Hindu-Buddhist alliance in Asia constituted 
an alternate geography that challenged the liberal internationalist order articulated and 
maintained by the Euro-American empires after the First World War. Yet McQuade does 
not appear to thoroughly interrogate Bose’s alternate geography in the context of the 
Japanese Empire. He claims that “Bose’s imagined national community did not fit the 
rigid ‘nationstate logic’ that formed the basis of the international system established by 
the European powers at Versailles” (McQuade 2016, 667); however, this statement is 
not entirely convincing. I would argue that Bose’s own internationalist vision and that of 
other Indian nationalists in Japan were very much embedded in the logic of the nation-
state. This connection between Bose’s internationalism and his commitment to the 
nation-state ideal is evident in his views of national revival for India, which emphasized 
fidelity to India’s “authentic” spiritual traditions rooted in Hinduism and cooperation 
with Japan in a community of independent nation-states in Asia.  
Bose was neither the first nor the last Indian nationalist to take refuge in Japan. 
Mahendra Pratap, an Indian prince-turned-revolutionary, carried out his activities in 
Japan during the 1920s and into the 1940s to gain support for his proposal to create a 
World Federation, a utopian world order that would transcend empire and the nation-
state. Carolien Stolte’s work on Pratap provides important insight into his career as an 
anti-imperialist whose internationalism was shaped by his journeys and the people he 
met. Stolte shows how internationalist visions are neither uniform nor static and are 
often entangled in imperial politics. This entanglement was evident in Pratap’s 
valorization of Japan during the interwar years and his subsequent disillusionment with 
Japan over the Asia-Pacific War (Stolte 2014). In 1923, Anand Mohan Sahay, a former 
medical student and activist for the Indian National Congress, arrived in Kobe to 
represent the interests of the Congress in Japan and to gain supporters for the 
independence struggle. Sahay was initially encouraged by Rajendra Prasad and 
Jawaharlal Nehru, who would become the first president and prime minister of India 
after independence. Aiyappan-Pillai Madhavan Nair was another Indian nationalist 
based in the Kansai region. In 1928, Nair arrived in Kyoto as an engineering student at 
Kyoto Imperial University. He quickly became involved with Bose’s activities and 
developed a close relationship with the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo.  
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It is important to situate the encounters between Indian nationalists and Japanese 
Pan-Asianists during this period in the wider context of the Japanese Empire, as well as 
nationalist and internationalist politics in India and the South Asian diaspora. Such 
encounters should not be regulated as mere footnotes in either Japanese imperial 
history or South Asian history but should be understood through the politics of 
comparison and deflection. Here I draw on the work of Ann Laura Stoler and Satoshi 
Mizutani. Whereas Stoler (2001) focuses on how colonizers deployed the politics of 
comparison in relation to other empires, Mizutani shows how colonized groups also 
engaged in a politics of comparison. Crucially, Mizutani (2015) shows that comparisons 
between the colonized did not always produce anti-imperial solidarities; rather, activism 
against one empire was often used to reinforce the legitimacy of another empire.  
Drawing on all these insights, I seek to understand how Japanese Pan-Asianist 
activists, Buddhist scholars, and a host of other commentators deployed a politics of 
comparison as they encountered and situated India within an imperial worldview that 
placed Japan in competition with the British Empire. We can grasp how the politics of 
comparison was mobilized by Indian nationalists in Japan by understanding how they 
placed their engagement with the Japanese Empire within their anti-British activism and 
their nationalist imaginings. I thus argue that the comparisons drawn by Japanese Pan-
Asianists as well as Indian nationalists mutually reinforced their respective imperial and 
national projects. However, it is equally important to not overstate the appeal that 
Japanese Pan-Asianism and its Indian supporters held. Bose, Sahay, Nair, and Pratap had 
no shortage of critics in India and in Indian communities in Japan and elsewhere. This 
was especially true as more Indians became aware of the growing connections between 
Japanese Pan-Asianists and the Hindu nationalist movement, which also included 
conservative elements within the Indian National Congress (INC).  
Japanese overtures to Indian nationalists in both the diaspora and India proper 
were part of a wider goal to claim leadership over Asia and the colonized world for 
Japan and to ensure that Japan itself would be ready to assume the task. Like most 
empires after the First World War and in the years leading up to and after the Great 
Depression, Japan faced a crisis of imperial decline. The pressures of nationalist 
movements in Japan’s colonies and the growing urban and rural discontent in the 
Japanese metropole concerned many intellectuals and policymakers. In order to 
overcome the crisis of imperial decline, defenders of empire during the interwar years 
often deployed narrative strategies that deflected from the inherent exploitation and 
violence of empire that creates crisis in the first place. Jeanne Morefield convincingly 
argues this point in Empires without Imperialism, a book concerning British and 
American imperial decline during the interwar period and into the early twenty-first 
century. As she explains, liberal apologists for empire deployed a narrative strategy that 
espoused a return to original values or “who we are” as the bastions of liberal 
democratic ideals to deflect charges of their empire’s inherent illiberality (Morefield 
2014, 3).  
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I argue here that a similar process took place in the Japanese Empire as Pan-
Asianist intellectuals and activists called for a return to original values. However, these 
values were articulated as a rejection of Anglo-American liberalism and framed within a 
culturalist discourse of “Asian civilization” and the revival of national authenticity. For 
many Pan-Asianist thinkers, the crisis that Japan faced in the 1920s and into the early 
1930s signaled to them that Japan needed to abandon its participation in an Anglo-
American imperial order and return to its spiritual foundations to fulfill its mission of 
liberating and reviving Asia from Western imperialism and civilizational decay. This 
perspective did not imply a rejection of scientific modernity but a synthesis of what 
earlier Tokugawa and Meiji intellectuals described as wakon yōsai 和魂洋才 (Japanese 
spirit, Western techniques). Japanese Pan-Asianists appealed to the claim that Japan 
mastered the techniques of Western modernity while drawing upon and preserving its 
national essence to assert moral superiority over the West. They also argued that 
Japan’s model of development should be exported to the rest of Asia. This 
comparison—that Japan was distinct and morally superior from the imperial powers of 
the West—allowed for Pan-Asianist commentators in Japan to not only deflect and gloss 
over the violence that underpinned Japanese imperialism but to also occlude the 
implications of Japan’s previous entanglements with the British and American empires.  
At a time when the language of internationalism coincided with the creation of 
economic blocs, Japanese advocates for national regeneration and Pan-Asianist ideals 
envisioned an alternate international order that stood in opposition to the League of 
Nations and the Third Communist International (Comintern, also known as the Third 
International). Yet, as Duara has shown, nationalist agendas often coopted the 
redemptive and utopian invocations of civilizational revival for Asia to further imperial 
expansion (Duara 2001, 99–100). Whereas Duara crucially argues that this was not 
necessarily the case either in Japan or elsewhere, my interest is in elucidating the 
nationalist appropriations of Pan-Asianist ideals. I explore what these ideals meant for 
how Ōkawa Shūmei, Nakatani Takeyo, and many other figures understood and 
interpreted movements for self-determination in Asia, particularly in British India. 
According to them, it was up to Japan to assume the mantle of leadership over Asia and 
guide its neighbors toward liberation and development. Just as Japan identified divisive 
and harmful elements within the nation and sought to harmonize these elements under 
the goal of national and spiritual revival, Asia had to do the same. During the 1930s, 
when the fault lines within the Indian nationalist movement became more pronounced, 
Japanese attempts to court Indian nationalist opinion encountered significant barriers 
despite appeals to both Pan-Asianism and Pan-Islamism. 
Much has been written about Japanese overtures calling for anticolonial solidarity 
outside the traditional area-studies definition of “East Asia.” The works of Cemil Aydin 
(2007) and Selçuk Esenbel (2011) are noted for their immense contributions in 
understanding Japan’s relationship with the Islamic world. Similarly, scholars such as 
Joseph Calvitt Clarke (2011), Marc Gallicchio (2000), and Gerald Horne (2018) have 
drawn attention to the fascinating connections between Japan, Africa, and Black 
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Internationalism in the United States. There is also an extensive body of scholarship on 
Japan’s relationship with the Buddhist world in South and Southeast Asia. Richard Jaffe’s 
Seeking Sakyamuni: South Asia in the Formation of Modern Japanese Buddhism (2019) is 
a highly compelling account that brings together the journeys of Buddhist monks and 
intellectuals such as Kitabatake Dōryū, Shaku Kōzen, Kawaguchi Ekai, and many others 
to locate and recuperate an “authentic” and “pure” Buddhism from South Asia. Jaffe 
underscores the importance of South Asia to the formation of a Japanese Buddhist 
modernity that, in the view of its proponents, needed to guide social and political 
reform in Japan as well as economic and imperial expansion abroad.  
Such projects to recover the spiritual authenticity of the nation resonated with the 
Hindu right. Jaffe mentions the connections that developed between Japanese 
Buddhists and Hindu nationalists in India during the interwar years, though he does not 
probe these alliance-building activities in depth (Jaffe 2019, 244–246). Understanding 
this important connection is essential in understanding the appeal as well as the 
limitations of Japan’s Pan-Asian and Pan-Islamist overtures in the context of South Asia. 
Rash Behari Bose, who was the source of information for many Japanese Pan-Asianist 
commentators on Indian affairs, openly sympathized with the Hindu Mahasabha, a 
right-wing Hindu nationalist party, and its advocacy for an undivided Hindu India at the 
expense of other minorities such as Muslims and Christians. Japanese Pan-Asianists and 
Buddhist intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s failed to problematize the idea of 
“authenticity” itself while consistently interpreting and celebrating Mahatma Gandhi’s 
movement as an anti-British movement rooted in the authentic, spiritual tradition of 
India. By associating authentic India with Hinduism and privileging a Hindu-Buddhist 
alliance at a time when Hindu-Muslim tensions and the politics of partition were gaining 
momentum, Japanese Pan-Asianists undermined their own appeals to Indian Muslims 
through Pan-Islamism and isolated themselves from the Indian left, which valued 
secularism and took a critical stance toward fascism.  
Yet even while many Indian nationalists became deeply suspicious of Japan during 
the interwar years, especially due to its actions in China during the 1930s, others were 
more sympathetic to the Japanese Pan-Asianist vision and its experiment in Manchukuo 
because of the implications these projects might have in directing the course of the 
Indian nationalist movement and providing a blueprint for post-independence India. 
Especially after the Great Depression, Indian nationalist leaders looked to the 
developmental state as a future model that could protect India from what they saw as 
the contingencies and exploitation of Western capitalism. However, for those who could 
not bear the broadly socialist direction of the Indian nationalist movement, let alone 
stomach the possibility of a communist India, Manchukuo offered an alternate nation-
state model. This model promised phenomenal industrial and economic growth while 
uniting a diverse, multiethnic region based on adherence to spiritual traditions and 
values that were at once Pan-Asian and local. As Benjamin Zachariah notes in his work 
on the discourse of development in India, nationalist leaders and economic planners on 
both the left and the right were preoccupied with national development not only as a 
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political and economic question but also as a moral and spiritual one. For India’s leaders, 
it was therefore necessary to define a “national morality” or “national values” that 
would guide India’s development as a modern nation-state (Zachariah 2005, 5–6).  
In The Nation and Its Fragments (1993), Partha Chatterjee argues that a key feature 
of anticolonial nationalism in the Indian context was the distinction between inner and 
outer realms. In the view of certain Indian nationalists, the Indian nation needed to 
acknowledge Western superiority in the outer material realm of technological 
advancement, economic progress, and military strength and seek to emulate these 
attributes. However, at the same time these nationalists argued that it would be 
through adherence to cultural and spiritual authenticity in the inner realm of the Indian 
nation that the nation could claim mastery over the outer realm and thereby gain moral 
superiority over the West. In this manner, Indian nationalists could claim India’s 
distinction from the West while obscuring the imperial genealogy from which they 
derived their nationalist imaginings (Chatterjee 1993, 6).  
Although Chatterjee provides important insight into the dynamics of anticolonial 
nationalism and a necessary critique of Eurocentric understandings of nationalist 
discourse, we must avoid taking the inner realm of the nation for granted by framing the 
inner within the confines of the nation-state. In other words, we must not simply 
reproduce the idea of the inner realm as the authentic domain and repository of a 
specifically national culture even while critiquing the mobilization of cultural/spiritual 
authenticity in anticolonial nationalism. Instead, this article demonstrates that the inner 
realm of the nation was itself a construct shaped through transnational processes and 
exchanges. For certain Indian nationalists, Japan and Manchukuo had already achieved 
mastery of the material through their fidelity to a shared Pan-Asian cultural/spiritual 
heritage. Subsequently, this mastery allowed Indian nationalists to ascribe moral 
legitimacy to Japan and Manchukuo over the West in leading Asia’s destiny as well as 
criticize socialist trends within the broader Indian nationalist movement and the 
discourse of nation-building. In his work on German-Indian connections, Kris Manjapra 
identifies how entanglements formed between Indian nationalists and their German 
supporters. This development resulted in the two groups depending on each other even 
while they pursued their own national and imperial goals (Manjapra 2014, 5–6). I argue 
that a similar process was at work as both Indian nationalists and Japanese Pan-Asianists 
tapped into the discourse of a shared Asiatic civilization while mobilizing each other for 
their own imperial and national ambitions.  
However, the consequences of these entanglements manifested in the failure of 
many Japanese Pan-Asianists to recognize and understand the multiple voices and 
visions within the Indian political landscape. They also led certain Indian nationalists to 
defend Japanese imperialism to varying degrees while articulating their own visions for 
the Indian nation-state and its place in Asia. Comparisons, therefore, enabled both 
groups to adopt narrative strategies that were used to deflect issues of imperial violence. 
This article points to how these entanglements affected Indian merchant groups in 
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Japan and Asia more broadly as Japanese policymakers and Indian nationalists sought to 
mobilize their wealth and networks behind their imperial or national goals.  
 
India in the Political Economy of Japanese Pan-Asianism 
 
In 1935, Nakatani Takeyo published a pamphlet in English titled, “Asiatic Asia: What 
Does It Mean?” outlining the principles that informed the vision of Dai Ajia kyōkai          
大亜細亜協会 (Greater Asia association). A professor at Hōsei University in Tokyo and a 
student of the Japanese Pan-Asianist intellectual Ōkawa Shūmei, Nakatani was actively 
involved in Pan-Asianist circles in Japan and, as secretary of Dai Ajia kyōkai, came into 
close contact with Indian nationalists such as Rash Behari Bose in Japan. In Nakatani’s 
view, Manchukuo was “the last barrier against the white invasion” and thus, from its 
establishment as an independent state, “great efforts should be now directed to unite 
and reconstruct the whole of Asia” (Nakatani 1935, 1). Nakatani’s program for the 
reconstruction of Asia required both economic and cultural emancipation from the West, 
and he found several examples in Asia, most notably India, where he understood the 
objective of nationalist movements to be “the restoration of their respective cultures.” 
Commenting on Gandhi and the Indian nationalist movement, Nakatani held that 
“Gandhi embodies the national will to restore the ancient Indian spiritual culture by 
denying the Western political and monetary systems as well as the civilization that 
underlies them” (1935, 12–13). 
It was thus Japan’s duty and moral responsibility to not cooperate with the League 
of Nations in suppressing Asian nationalism and instead adopt an “Asian-consciousness” 
by reforming its political and economic structure based on its spiritual culture 
manifested in nippon seishin 日本精神 (Japanese spirit) and guide its Asian neighbors 
toward political, economic, and cultural liberation and prosperity. He encapsulated this 
vision as the reestablishment in Japan of sumera mikuni 皇御国, an appellation for the 
Japanese Empire translated as the “Emperor’s Country” or the “Imperial Realm.” 
Nakatani, however, opted for the translation “Moral Empire” (Nakatani 1935, 13). 
Nakatani made several significant points in Asiatic Asia. His decision to publish the 
pamphlet in English, and his attempts to convince the reader of Japan’s moral authority 
over the West and its cultural/spiritual affinity with Asia, suggest that Nakatani had a 
non-Japanese readership in mind. Moreover, Nakatani makes several references to not 
only the Indian nationalist movement but also the economic conditions of India under 
Britain at the time. India was a major supplier of cotton for the Japanese textile industry. 
By the 1930s, cheap Japanese textile manufactures were flooding the Indian market. 
Concerned about how Japan’s economic activities would negatively affect Britain’s 
dominance in the textile trade with India, the British Indian government adopted 
protectionist measures in 1933 by imposing tariffs on Japanese textile imports and 
restrictions on the amount of Indian cotton supplied to Japan. Many Japanese Pan-
Asianists viewed these measures as evidence of Britain’s exploitation of India, which 
subsequently hindered the revival of Asia (Nakatani 1935, 10–11).  
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If the British Empire was a regressive immoral force suppressing the economic and 
spiritual vitality of Asia and India, Nakatani held that Japanese intervention was a 
progressive moral force reviving Asia and ushering humanity toward a new plane of 
development. In presenting Japan as the champion of Indian nationalism based on a 
shared cultural/spiritual heritage against Britain’s political, cultural, and economic 
exploitation, Nakatani’s pamphlet reveals how Japanese Pan-Asianists sought to 
mobilize Indian opinion in favor of Japan’s economic expansion in the region. This was 
also the case with Japanese business leaders involved in the textile manufacturing 
industry. In May 1932, Gotō Miyake, the director of the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company, 
gave a speech that was published in the monthly report of the Japan Cotton Spinners’ 
Association. In it, he expressed Japan’s commitment to the cause of Indian 
independence as beneficial to continued trade between India and Japan: 
 
The Indian independence question is one to which sympathy must be 
extended.…That India should have independence as her main principle 
excite [sic] our heart-felt sympathy and meets with our approval. 
Japanese cotton goods are much cheaper than English cotton goods, 
and the supply of them is of great advantage to the people of India. I 
think it is good for the people of India to accept what is profitable to 
them. The desire for independence from Britain is a very good thing, but 
to attain that independence, the strength of the Indian people will 
certainly have to be relied upon and at the same time sympathizers 
throughout the world will have to be sought. Especially deep is the 
sympathy of the Far East whether viewed from the standpoint of history, 
of religion, or of its relationship with India. To secure Japan as an ally 
will, I think, be a good step in the direction of attaining independence. 
Therefore, to exclude Japanese cotton goods from India will not be a 
good factor, and I think it would be for the good of both Japan and India 
for the latter to become intimate with the former and draw closer 
together in her economic relations.1 
 
Pan-Asianist organizations in Japan took a more radical approach in expressing 
their opposition toward British imperialism in India. On January 18, 1932, a group of 
fifteen youths affiliated with an organization called Kenkokukai 建国会 (National 
founding society) demonstrated in front of the British Embassy in Tokyo and distributed 
pamphlets calling for the release of Gandhi from prison. Established in 1926, Kenkokukai 
was an ultra-nationalist and anticommunist organization that had anarchist roots before 
veering toward the far right. Under the leadership of Akao Bin, Kenkokukai had been 
involved in the bombing of the Soviet embassy in the spring of 1928. The pamphlets 
 
1 National Archives (NA), FO 262/1814. Text of a speech made by Mr. Gotō Miyake, a director of 
the Kanegafuchi Spinning Co. included in Letter from the British Consulate-General, Osaka, June 
30, 1932, p. 2.  
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distributed by Kenkokukai activists reveal how Pan-Asianists mobilized India to 
legitimize Japan as the champion of the colonized world in contrast to the immorality of 
the British Empire: 
 
The whole Japanese nation, which loves justice irrespective of 
nationality, feels a sense of pain and indignation at the tragic arrest and 
incarceration, on account of his having incurred the displeasure of Great 
Britain, of the patriot Mahatma Gandhi, who has been going through 
endless suffering in his effort to rescue his 300 million compatriots from 
the fetters of tyrannical England. At a time like the present when justice 
is by way of being trampled upon [sic] and humanitarianism disregarded, 
we the people of Japan at least demand of the British Government that 
they should immediately set at liberty the champion of justice Mahatma 
Gandhi.2 
 
Religious leaders in Japan also expressed sympathy toward the Indian nationalist 
cause. On January 26, 1936, the Higashi Gokuraku temple in Kobe held a memorial 
service jointly organized by the Kobe Buddhist Association and the Kansai Indo-Japanese 
Association to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Indian 
National Congress and to remember those who lost their lives in the struggle for Indian 
independence. Kobayashi Yoshio, the head priest of the temple, presided over the event, 
which was attended by sixty Shinto and Buddhist priests along with two hundred Indians 
and Japanese, including Anand Mohan Sahay. Rash Behari Bose and Tōyama Mitsuru of 
Gen’yōsha sent speeches to be read on their behalf. In his concluding address, Sahay 
stated, “We shall grudge no effort and spare no sacrifice to achieve the mission 
bequeathed to us by those who have gone before. We hope for the support and 
understanding of Japan, the leading Power among the Eastern Peoples.”3  
Many Japanese Buddhist scholars and intellectuals who commented on Indian 
affairs reflected on the disconnect between the India they knew through studying 
Buddhist and Indian philosophy, and the reality of contemporary India under British 
colonial subjugation. This is especially evident in the case of Yamagami Sōgen, who 
studied early Indian Buddhism at Calcutta University and, upon returning to Japan in 
1912, took a professorship at Komazawa University run by the Sōtō Zen sect in Saitama, 
Tokyo. In an article published in the December 1932 issue of the Journal of the Indo-
Japanese Association, Yamagami takes the reader through the history of early Buddhism 
to identify what caused the teachings of Buddha to decline in the region of its birth. 
Yamagami praised Buddhist kings such as Ashoka, who extended royal patronage to the 
Buddhist community, as wise and enlightened leaders whose support of Buddha’s 
 
2 NA, FO 262/1814. Translation of pamphlet “Release Gandhi immediately” included in Letter 
from the British Embassy, Tokyo, January 25, 1932, p. 5. 
3 India Office Records (IOR), L/P&J/12/480, Memorandum: Indian Activities in Kobe, British 
Consulate, Kobe, January 30, 1936.  
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teachings directly contributed to the power, prosperity, and prestige of their reigns. 
Conversely, Yamagami observes that when Buddhism was not honored, there was chaos 
and disorder (Yamagami 1932, 68–70). Ultimately, he identifies two factors that 
sounded the death knell of Buddhism in India—corruption and schisms within the 
Buddhist leadership, and the prevalence of incorrect teaching coupled with the 
importation of foreign ideas—thus weakening India, making it vulnerable in the wake of 
Muslim invasions, and leading to centuries of foreign rule and spiritual degradation 
(1932, 71–72).  
Yamagami wrote his outline on the decline of Buddhism in India with Japan in mind. 
The concluding paragraphs of his article use the example of India as a warning to Japan 
about the perils of abandoning its ancient spiritual civilization and importing foreign 
ideologies: Should Japan forsake Buddhist teachings, tolerate corrupt leadership, and 
allow disunity and confusion to spread via foreign influences, it would share the same 
fate as India and be taken advantage of by predatory powers. Thus, Yamagami held that 
Japan must guard its Buddhist heritage and assigned Japan a moral obligation to play 
the leading role in the spiritual rejuvenation of Asia, including India (Yamagami 1932, 
73). Yamagami’s writings reveal how Pan-Asianist ideologues produced knowledge to 
compare the Indian past with Japan’s present to press for domestic reform within Japan 
based on adherence to cultural/spiritual authenticity. Simultaneously, Pan-Asianists 
used such comparisons to justify imperial intervention and expansion abroad under the 
ostensible goal of reviving and safeguarding the cultural/spiritual authenticity of Asia 
and its political sovereignty against the West. However, the exclusivist claims of the 
discourse of civilization as articulated in Japanese Pan-Asianist ideology, namely, that 
national and transnational community within Asia could only be framed in culturalist 
terms with Japan as its lodestar, attempted to foreclose and suppress the possibility 
that Japanese, Indians, and other groups within Asia could form alternative alliances 
outside a culturalist Pan-Asian vision. 
During the 1930s, a number of Japanese Pan-Asianist and Buddhist activists 
traveled to India to establish links with the Indian nationalist movement. Many received 
a cold reception from members of the INC, who were largely supportive of the 
Guomindang and hostile toward Japanese expansionism in China. However, Japanese 
activists met with greater success among members of the Hindu right. In 1933, Fujii 
Gyōshō (also known as Fujii Nichidatsu) and Ohkitsu Tadao, two Buddhist monks of the 
Nichiren sect, traveled to India to establish links with Indian nationalists. While Fujii was 
staying at Gandhi’s ashram in Wardha, Maharashtra, he sent Ohkitsu to attend the 
annual meeting of the Hindu Mahasabha in Ajmer, Rajasthan. The Mahasabha warmly 
received Ohkitsu, who gave a speech before the assembly calling for a Hindu-Buddhist 
alliance. In response, the Mahasabha pledged to deepen links with Japanese Pan-
Asianist and Buddhist organizations.4 
 
4 IOR, L/P&J/12/480, Letter from the Director of Public Information, Home Department, 
Government of India to H. MacGregor Esq., Information Officer, India Office, London, April 9, 
1934, p. 11. 
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Such alliance-building illustrates how fascist projects mobilized each other to 
ascribe legitimacy to their respective visions. It is well documented that under the 
leadership of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, the ideological hue of the Hindu Mahasabha 
became closely affiliated with the far right. Savarkar and others within the Mahasabha 
openly admired Nazi Germany, and Savarkar’s elucidation of Hindutva, which would 
later become the guiding ideology of Hindu nationalist politics in both colonial and 
postcolonial India, drew inspiration from fascist paramilitarism and racial theories. The 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or “National Volunteer Organization,” which achieved 
notoriety for its role in the assassination of Gandhi and its violence against religious 
minorities such as Muslims and Christians, began as a radical offshoot of the Mahasabha 
and was modeled on the “Blackshirts” of Mussolini’s Italy and the Nazi Sturmabteilung. 
According to Manjapra, Savarkar took the initiative in building close ties with the 
international Nazi movement. The Nazis themselves hoped to use the Mahasabha to 
establish a Hindu-Buddhist alliance between India, China, and Japan (Manjapra 2014, 
208). 
Savarkar and Bose were in correspondence with each other regarding the 
establishment of a branch of the Hindu Mahasabha in Japan (McQuade 2016, 658). This 
growing connection between Japan and the Hindu right was observed with alarm by 
certain members of the Indian diaspora. During the Asia-Pacific War, Krishnalal 
Shridharani, an Indian journalist living in the United States and a strong critic of both 
Japanese imperialism and Hindu nationalism, wrote about the significance of links that 
developed between the two during the interwar years: 
 
Japan’s Pan-Buddhism drive has had a special appeal for the militant 
India-for-the-Hindus group in India. They appear to have found in Japan 
an answer to their rivals, the communalist Mohammedans. The extra-
territorial allegiance of sundry Muslim leaders has always perturbed 
those Hindus who desire to maintain the territorial integrity of India 
when the British have withdrawn.…While the Mohammedans were 
looking across [the] Hindu Kush towards Afghanistan and Arabia, these 
Hindu leaders were apparently directing their attention across the Indo-
Chinese border to Japan. The militant wing of the Hindu Mahasabha 
wanted to create a Pan-Buddhist bloc as a bulwark against Pan-Islamism. 
They dreamed of a Pan-Buddhist bloc, composed of Japan, India, China, 
Siam, Cambodia, Java, Burma, Tibet, and Ceylon, dominating Asia by 
overwhelming the Islamic bloc of Afghanistan, Persia, Egypt, Arabia, Iraq, 
and Turkey.…Militant Hindu leaders appeared to be ready to pay the 
price for this dream by granting Asiatic hegemony to Japan. (Shridharani 
1942, 99–100) 
 
Shridharani further noted that, from the perspective of Japan, “Pan-Buddhism 
propaganda was nothing more than a tactical move. The whole Asiatic policy of Japan 
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has been motivated by her desire to disturb the established balance of power in the East 
and to take advantage of the Asia-for-Asiatics feeling for its own expansionist aims” 
(1942, 100). Crucially, Shridharani regarded Japan’s simultaneous backing of Pan-
Islamist movements as a “paradox inexplicable except in light of Japan’s opportunism” 
(1942, 100). 
Opportunism might be one way to explain the paradox of Japanese Pan-Asianists 
simultaneously supporting both Pan-Islamism and a Pan-Buddhist/Hindu movement. It 
is also important to understand this paradox by considering how Japanese intellectuals 
understood and interpreted pan-nationalist movements, as well as the political trends 
that developed in India during the 1930s. Much has been written about how Japanese 
Pan-Asianists, such as Ōkawa Shūmei, sought to build connections and support 
anticolonial nationalist movements in the Islamic world (Aydin 2007; Esenbel 2011). 
However, the situation was more complicated regarding the question of India’s Muslims. 
In Fukkō Ajia no shomondai 復興亜細亜の諸問題 (Various issues of resurgent Asia), 
Ōkawa interpreted the tensions between the INC and the All-India Muslim League as 
part of Britain’s long-standing policy of divide and rule (Ōkawa 1922, 101). Ōkawa 
celebrated the trend toward Hindu-Muslim unity that culminated in the signing of the 
Lucknow Pact in 1916 during the First World War and Gandhi’s efforts to cultivate a 
national consciousness to resist British rule that transcended religious and class lines, as 
is evident in Gandhi’s support for the Khilafat movement calling for the preservation of 
the Ottoman Empire and its caliph. For Ōkawa, Gandhi was the leading figure who 
would revive India and free it from British exploitation, and he even elevated Gandhi 
and Lenin as the two personalities who encapsulated the essence of the anti-Western 
revolutionary projects sweeping across Asia (Ōkawa 1922, 102, 111–113; Aydin 2007, 
148, 243).  
However, in the year Ōkawa published Fukkō Ajia no shomondai, Hindu-Muslim 
unity was unraveling. Religious violence escalated throughout the 1920s in the wake of 
Gandhi’s decision to call off the noncooperation movement, and the abolition of the 
Ottoman Caliphate. By 1930, the two-nation theory, which called for greater autonomy 
for India’s Muslims, was being advocated by prominent members of the All-India 
Muslim League (hereafter, Muslim League), such as Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad 
Ali Jinnah. Distrust between the INC and the Muslim League became more pronounced 
when Gandhi rejected the terms presented by the British Indian government in the 
Communal Award of 1932, which guaranteed separate representation for Muslims and 
Dalits. For many Muslims in India, the INC’s claims of upholding secularism and pluralism 
were betrayed by their concessions to the interests of upper-caste Hindus (Devji 2013, 2).  
Ōkawa does not appear to have commented on these developments. Yet Ōkawa 
and Nakatani’s insistence on Gandhi representing the national will of the anticolonial 
movement in India was a problematic stance to take, considering the rift that developed 
in the 1930s between the Muslim League and the INC. Nakatani argued in the Pan-
Asianist journal Dai Ajiashugi 大亜細亜主義 (Greater Asianism) that the failure of the 
Pan-Islamic movement during and immediately following the First World War was due 
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to its premature development before individual Muslim countries could consolidate 
themselves into nation-states (Nakatani 1933, 58–59). According to Nakatani, this was 
what made the Ottoman Empire’s appeals to Pan-Islamist sentiment pliable toward 
German imperial interests during the war (Nakatani 1933, 58). Nakatani argued for a 
“Neo Pan-Islamism” that would be centered on the newly emerging nation-states within 
the Islamic world, such as Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Syria, and Morocco (Nakatani 
1933, 59). But if consolidating a nation-state was the critical prerequisite for progressing 
toward this new incarnation of Pan-Islamism, where did Indian Muslims belong? 
Nakatani does not address their position in his article. Nor does he address the position 
of other minorities in the Middle East in his proposed outline for a Pan-Islamic 
community. If the implication was that minorities had to submit themselves to a 
discourse of harmony welded together by the national will of a single individual or party, 
then the paradox identified by Shridharani speaks as well to the limitations that Duara 
identified in appealing to the nation-state model as the foundational building block of 
civilizational community (Duara 2001, 107–108).  
 
Indian Nationalists and the Japanese Empire 
 
Much of the knowledge that Japanese Pan-Asianists like Ōkawa Shūmei received about 
Indian affairs came from and were filtered by their connections with Indian nationalists 
like Rash Behari Bose. However, activists such as Bose were also producing knowledge 
about the Japanese Empire in ways that affirmed their own nationalist projects. Japan 
and Manchukuo represented for Bose possible models of development for India that 
were not dependent on what he saw as Western ideologies. In critiquing socialist and 
communist trends within the Indian nationalist movement, Bose argued that even if 
India achieved political independence from the British and adopted communism, it 
would remain under the cultural hegemony of the West through the British Communist 
Party and the Soviet Union. Thus, Bose suggested that the way forward for India was to 
follow the examples of Japan and Manchukuo, two nations that pursued national 
development based on and without compromising their cultural/spiritual integrity (Bose 
1938, 214–217).  
Likewise, D. S. Deshpande, an Indian journalist at the Asahi Shinbun involved in 
Pan-Asianist circles during the 1930s, published a comparative study between Hinduism 
and Shintoism in the November and December 1936 issues of Cultural Nippon, arguing 
that India and Japan shared the same spiritual heritage. Subsequently, Deshpande 
argued that Hinduism could and should function as the guiding spiritual ideology that 
would unite state and society and inform India’s national development, just as 
Shintoism did for Japan. Deshpande drew attention to what he identified as the 
collectivist and nationalistic attributes latent in both ideologies and wrote that Hinduism 
“is nothing but a mere Indian commentary on the concept of nationalism, just as Shinto 
is the Japanese concept of the same and, therefore, the two are nothing but two 
analogous quantities in the field of the philosophy of religion.” Deshpande even 
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concluded that the universalizing imperative expressed in the slogan hakkō ichiu 八紘一
宇 (“Eight cords, one roof” or “All the world under one roof”) also found expression in 
the Bhagavad Gita and other Hindu scriptures as wasudhaiwa kutumbakam, translating 
both sayings as “world-familyism” (Deshpande 1936, 342–343).  
However, infusing Japan with moral superiority in this manner, in contrast to the 
materialistic immorality of Western and Soviet imperialism, led many Indian nationalists 
who were sympathetic toward Japan to gloss over and defend the violence of Japanese 
imperialism. In an article in Dai Ajiashugi, Bose asserted that China’s anti-Japanese 
policy after the establishment of Manchukuo was harming the cause of Asian unity and 
strengthening the efforts of Western powers to keep China divided and subjugated. 
Bose implored China’s politicians to abandon anti-Japanese policies and stressed the 
urgency of an alliance between Japan, China, and India for the revival of an independent 
Asia. However, he also warned that, so long as China’s politicians pursued an anti-
Japanese policy, Japan would be forced to take a hard-line stance against China and act 
in self-defense to pave the way for an Asia free from the oppression of the West. Bose 
acknowledged that he might be misinterpreted by many Chinese as being pro-Japanese 
but deflected this criticism by saying that he was part of a “pro-Asian independence 
faction” (shin Ajia dokuritsuha 親亜細亜独立派) (Bose 1934, 61). He was convinced that 
Japan’s violence was guided by the morality of its cause and therefore legitimate, given 
the threats that Asia faced from the Western powers. Moreover, Bose did not question 
how “independence” would be interpreted, and by whom, within Japan’s community of 
nation-states. Consequently, he ignored the fact that China’s plight was due to the 
exploitation inherent in both Japanese and Euro-American imperialism.  
Anand Mohan Sahay shared Bose’s viewpoint. Also a frequent contributor to Dai 
Ajiashugi, Sahay argued that the establishment of Manchukuo presented evidence of 
Japan’s sincerity toward Asian nationalist movements. Sahay made the comparison that 
whereas Indian aspirations for self-determination had been met with suppression and 
delaying tactics by the British authorities, Japan readily gave Manchukuo its 
independence. Sahay emphasized that India’s future lay with greater cooperation with 
Japan, and he implored that Japan should actively support the Indian independence 
movement. Moreover, he attributed the rapid progress and development of Manchukuo 
to the overall harmonious relationship between Japan and the various ethnicities that 
made up Manchukuo, bound as they were by a common Asian civilization (Sahay 1935, 
30–31).  
Sahay’s conviction that Japan was a “moral” empire in contrast to the British was 
particularly evident in a pamphlet that he wrote during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War 
(1935–1937), Coloured Ethiopia (1936). Curiously, although Sahay begins with a 
condemnation of Italian aggression against Ethiopia and British indifference toward its 
plight, he uses the crisis in Ethiopia to defend Japanese economic imperialism in Africa 
and India. According to Sahay, the root cause of Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia was to 
forcibly restore the market for Italian manufacturers in Ethiopia and prevent Japan from 
gaining an economic foothold in the region:  
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It is reported that recently the market for Italian goods in Ethiopia has 
greatly dwindled. Italian goods are not much in demand. As in other 
markets, cheap and superior Japanese goods have ousted other 
manufactures including that of Italy from Ethiopian markets. Italian 
manufacturers are consequently greatly embarrassed and have been 
pressing Mussolini’s government very hard to act in such a way as to 
restore [the] Ethiopian market for them. According to a clause in [the] 
Italo-Ethiopian agreement, Ethiopians are expected to buy goods from 
Italy[,] to employ Italian experts in various branches of activities, both 
civil and military, and so on. For whatever reason it may be, Ethiopians 
seem to not be in love with the Italians to such an extent as to buy 
costly Italian products in preference to superior and less costly Japanese 
goods and to sacrifice efficiency that can be available in the experts 
from other countries, by employing Italian experts. (Sahay 1936, 5) 
 
Sahay used the claim that Ethiopians preferred Japanese goods because of their 
superior quality and low cost to make a point about what he believed to be the 
benevolence of Japan in promoting the development and well-being of the colonized 
world. Turning to Britain’s economic exploitation of Ethiopia and throughout Africa and 
Asia, Sahay noted that Italian aggression and British deception and political 
maneuvering were different shades of what he defined as Western imperialism, in 
contrast to what he viewed as a morally guided Orient (Sahay 1936, 6–10). Sahay 
contrasts the immorality of British economic exploitation in India with the uplifting 
effects of Japanese commerce: 
 
Although it is India’s individual loss, that India’s money is robbed by the 
British, if we take it collectively, the Orient as a whole is being 
impoverished to that extent. Even in commerce, if India buys Japanese 
manufactures, the money remains in the Orient, while in the case of 
British goods it goes to a country which has been using it for 
suppressing and enslaving ourselves. In no other country, where masses 
are so poor, one can find such an expensive and extravagant 
administration. The British officials in India live the life of princes and 
draw allowances which even a real prince would envy. (Sahay 1936, 15) 
 
Responding to claims that Italy was doing in Ethiopia the same as what Japan did in 
Manchuria, Sahay appealed to the morality of Japan to establish a fundamental 
difference regarding its empire in comparison with the empires of the West: 
 
I do not believe that Japan has actually subjugated Manchuria, although 
it may apparently look like Japan’s dominion. Japan has created its 
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influence and has in return co-operated with Manchukuo in establishing 
peace and in making the land prosperous and progressive. A visit to 
different parts of Manchukuo by one who had known the country 
before 1931 will convince that the situation in that land is much better 
than in other parts of China, whatever the reason may be. I may be 
exposed to contradiction; but I feel that the policy of Japan in 
Manchukuo is that of “Live and let live,” the principle of co-existence. 
This code of morality is unknown to the Western imperialists. Mussolini 
has made it clear through his various declarations that his object is to 
subjugate the Ethiopians. We have numerous examples of the effect of 
Western colonial policy on the subject races. In no case can we find a 
nation under subjugation of the West to be peaceful and prosperous. 
(Sahay 1936, 18) 
 
According to Sahay, the values that guided Japan and the Orient in general included 
the “principle of co-existence” evident in Japan’s relationship with Manchukuo. In 
claiming that Japan’s empire was based on a morality that was absent in the empires of 
Britain and Italy, Sahay also emphasized that Japan needed to uphold its mission to 
champion the cause of Ethiopia and the colonized world. Although there was significant 
support for Ethiopia’s cause among the Japanese public, policymakers in Japan were 
simultaneously pursing closer relations with Italy to cultivate an alliance against British 
imperial hegemony (Clarke 2011; Hofmann 2015). Sahay observed this trend and 
predicted that an alliance with Italy might be a necessary compromise with what he 
identified as the “lesser evil” of Italian fascism in comparison with the “greater evil” of 
British imperialism. Yet, in Sahay’s view, the legitimacy of such an alliance rested on 
Japan’s commitment to liberating Asia from the tyranny of the West (Sahay 1936, 19).  
While Sahay was writing Coloured Ethiopia, Aiyappan-Pillai Madhavan Nair’s 
activities in Manchukuo and Mongolia were also indicative of the intersections between 
Indian anti-British activism and support for the Japanese Empire. Born in the princely 
state of Travancore, Nair participated in local boycott movements against British goods, 
which greatly concerned his family. Worried for his safety, Nair’s brother arranged for 
him to study engineering at Kyoto Imperial University (Nair 1982, 38–39). Upon his 
arrival in Kyoto in March 1928, Nair quickly became involved in Pan-Asianist politics, 
meeting with Rash Behari Bose, Tōyama Mitsuru, and Uchida Ryōhei, the leader of a 
well-known Pan-Asianist society called Kokuryūkai 黒龍会 (Black dragon society). Nair 
also participated in the anti-Lytton Commission protests organized by Ōkawa Shūmei in 
the Kansai region between 1931 and 1933 (Nair 1982, 87). As part of his nationalist 
activism, Nair developed connections within the Japanese military and lectured on 
Indian affairs at various military and civilian gatherings (1982, 76). The most notable of 
Nair’s military connections was Lieutenant General Itagaki Seishirō, then Chief of 
Intelligence for the Kwantung Army and one of the architects behind the 1931 Manchurian 
Incident (1982, 96). 
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During a trip with Mahendra Pratap to Manchukuo and Mongolia in 1933, Nair 
noticed that Tibetan and Mongolian herders were selling wool to Chinese Muslim 
caravans. These caravans then traveled to the British concession in Tianjin, which 
transported the wool to the large textile mills of Manchester and Lancashire (Nair 1982, 
106–107). Concerned that Britain was unjustly profiting from this wool trade at the 
expense of China, Nair received approval from Itagaki to conduct an intelligence 
operation to hinder British economic interests in the region. With support from the 
Kwantung Army and several large textile firms in Kansai, Nair, Lieutenant Nagashima of 
the Army Reserve Corps, and Colonel Kuo of the Manchukuo Imperial Army established 
a purchase mission in the summer of 1937 at Baotou in Inner Mongolia (see figure 1). 
Nair, Nagashima, and Kuo convinced Chinese Muslim traders to sell their wool at the 
purchasing station in Baotou instead of Tianjin, ensuring that the profits of the trade 
would not go to Britain (1982, 129–135). Nair was also involved in opening negotiations 
between Itagaki and Prince Demchugdongrub (also known as Prince De or Prince Teh), 
the Mongol leader who would later head the Japanese client-state of Mengjiang (1982, 
110). During another visit to Manchukuo in 1938, Nair helped train Korean exiles from 
Shanghai and the Soviet Union living in Manchukuo in espionage techniques to create a 
pro-Japanese Korean client-state in the Soviet Far East. Leading the group was Lee Kai-
Ten, a Korean nationalist who, like Nair, had a close relationship with Uchida Ryōhei and 
the Kokuryūkai. Lee and his agents crossed into the Soviet Union in 1940, but soon lost 
contact with Nair and their Kwantung Army handlers. After 1945, Nair found out that 
some of the exiles he had trained occupied prominent positions in the North Korean 
government. Lee’s fate, however, remains unknown.  (1982, 140–146).  
Nair regarded his activities in northeast Asia as a continuation of his anti-British 
activities in India. He connected his participation in burning Lancashire textiles in 
Tranvancore in 1925 with his activities in hindering the British wool trade in Inner 
Mongolia, all the while invoking the example of Gandhi’s movement to boycott British 
goods (Nair 1982, 108). However, Nair’s position toward the Japanese Empire was in 
many ways like that of Sahay. As an ardent supporter of Japan’s involvement in 
Manchuria, Nair believed that Japan was a benevolent force in Asia. Comparing British 
rule in India with Japan’s role in Manchukuo, he observed that “British policy was to 
manipulate any industrial growth of India in such a way that it would remain perpetually 
dependent on its Colonial base. Japan’s effort was to enable Manchukuo’s industry to 
stand on its own legs” (Nair 1982, 97). In contrast to the strategy of divide and rule that 
Britain followed in India, Nair was also impressed by the emphasis on racial harmony in 
Manchukuo and the relief programs implemented for underprivileged groups (1982, 97).  
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Figure 1. Aiyappan-Pillai Madhavan Nair (center) with Lieutenant Nagashima (left) and an 
unnamed news reporter in Baotou, 1937. Source: Nair (1982, n.p.). 
 
Despite Sahay and Nair’s valid criticisms of British imperialism, by creating a moral 
hierarchy in which Japan occupied an exalted place above other empires, both men 
were prone to ignoring or glossing over the violence and exploitation behind Japanese 
imperialism and arguing that British rule over India was far more exploitative, brutal, 
and less accommodating toward self-determination. Sahay and Nair’s favorable views of 
the Japanese Empire, as well as their claims that they were nationalists working for the 
cause of India above all else, blunted their occasional criticisms of Japan’s imperial 
violence and deflected attention from their involvement in furthering Japanese interests. 
When Nair found out that the purchasing mission he established in Baotou had 
collapsed as a result of the heavy-handed measures adopted by Japanese military 
commanders in the region to buy the wool of the Chinese Muslim caravans at lower 
rates, he blamed arrogant officers in the army and stopped short of criticizing the 
nature of Japanese imperialism itself (Nair 1982, 137–139). Likewise, when Sahay visited 
Manchukuo and northern China in 1938 on a tour sponsored by Ōkawa and the South 
Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu), he portrayed the Japanese administrators 
and officials he met, such as Yuzawa Michio, as enlightened and sincere. Yuzawa, the 
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Japanese political adviser to the Provisional Government of the Republic of China, 
worked closely with the North China Area Army and was a close friend of Sahay’s, 
supporting his activities as governor of Hyōgo Prefecture. Sahay concluded from his 
travels that Japanese rule would ultimately be beneficial for China and Asia despite 
initial challenges and resistance (Sahay 2009, 245–259).  
If part of Sahay’s purpose in writing Coloured Ethiopia was to convince an Indian 
readership that Japan’s economic penetration of India was a positive trend, many Indian 
merchants and business owners strongly disagreed. Vishnu R. Karandikar, writing to the 
Times of India on February 20, 1934, lamented how Japanese trading firms in India were 
undercutting local textile distributors: 
 
I have seen the keen competition which the Japanese are putting up in 
the Indian market and the way they have been able to undersell Indian 
goods to an extent which makes it impossible for any Indian concern to 
compete with them. I had to consider this question because at every 
place I visited I came across Japanese hawkers. I have visited Ujjain, 
Gwalior, Delhi, Lucknow, Allahabad, Patna, Benares, Calcutta, Jagannath, 
Puri, Ajmer, Indore, and several places along the Narmada river. This list 
will give the readers an idea of the vast field covered by Japanese 
hawkers.…They have come well equipped with the knowledge of our 
means of communications, even up to the footpaths that traverse the 
jungles in Central India. (Karandikar 1934, 16) 
 
Karandikar goes on to describe how the Japanese hawkers he observed in the 
villages of north and central India were fluent in Hindi and often appealed to the 
common bond that Indians and Japanese shared as fellow “Asiatics” to dissuade Indian 
customers from boycotting their products (1934, 16). However, such appeals failed to 
convince many mill owners and workers that the dumping of Japanese textile goods on 
the Indian market was ultimately for India’s benefit. A month later, forty men 
representing two thousand workers of the Sassoon and Alliance Silk Mill Company and 
the Chhoi Silk Mill Company in Bombay approached the managing director of the former 
mill to press the government of India to impose heavier tariffs on Japanese silk 
manufactures. Due to the intense competition from Japanese textile firms, the two mills 
were forced to close in November 1933, leaving the millworkers unemployed for five 
months. Cotton millworkers were the most affected, and thousands were left without 
work as cotton mills across the city shut down (“Plight of the Bombay Silk Industry” 
1934, 14).  
As early as the 1920s, Indian industrialists and labor activists joined together in an 
uneasy alliance against cheap Japanese manufactures, which they viewed as a threat to 
local business and the interests of Indian workers. Communist leaders and trade 
unionists such as Shripad Amrit Dange and Narayan Malhar Joshi criticized the dumping 
practices of Japanese textile companies in India, such as the Tōyō Podar Cotton Mill, a 
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prominent example of Japanese investment in the Bombay textile industry. Dange and 
Joshi simultaneously expressed solidarity with Japanese workers and condemned the 
tactics employed by the police in Japan to suppress unions and socialist groups (Roy 
2008, 40–41). Even Gandhi, much to the disappointment of politicians such as Takaoka 
Daisuke, who worked for the Indo-Japanese Commercial Museum in Calcutta and hoped 
to gain Gandhi’s support, regarded accepting even a single yard of cheap Japanese cloth 
as a “poison to us, for it means the starvation of the poor people of India” (Desai 1938, 
404). 
Yet, for Indian nationalists such as Bose, Sahay, and Nair, their engagement in a 
politics of comparison that favored Japan against Britain as the more “moral” of the two 
empires ignored the reality of Japan’s economic exploitation of India and Asia, as well as 
the critical position that the INC took toward Japanese imperialism. Bose dismissed 
reports condemning Japan in the Indian press as anti-Japanese propaganda that 
hindered the Indian public from appreciating Japan’s intentions in Asia and needed to 
be corrected (Bose 1934, 60). By 1936, Sahay’s views had so diverged from the INC that 
Nehru wrote to Sahay requesting him to renounce his affiliation with the party 
(Bhargava 1986, 8–11).  
 
The Indian Merchant Diaspora in Japan and Manchukuo 
 
Indian merchant networks were central to the Japanese textile trade in South Asia and 
beyond. The history of the Indian merchant community in Japan stretches back to the 
beginning of the Meiji period (1868–1912). As early as 1872, Parsi and Muslim merchant 
firms such as J. B. Bhesania and M. Essabhoy & Sons established a presence in 
Yokohama. They were followed a decade later by Hindu Sindhi firms such as Wassiamull 
Assomull & Co (Shimizu 2005, 27–28). These early firms were involved in importing jute, 
indigo, and spices from India to Japan as well as distributing Japanese silk manufactures 
in India, China, Southeast Asia, and as far as British East and West Africa (Markovits 
2000, 123–124). In 1893, the large business conglomerates of Tata and Nippon Yūsen 
Kaisha established a shipping link connecting the cotton mills of Bombay and Kobe. 
Cotton soon replaced silk as the main commodity fueling the trade relationship between 
Japan and India. In the decade between 1921 and 1932, India supplied 50 percent of 
Japan’s requirements for raw cotton (Iqbal 1990, 25). By 1937, Japan had captured 37 
percent of the global cotton textile market, a feat due in no small part to the various 
Indian merchant networks on which Japan’s business houses began to increasingly rely 
after Chinese merchants started to withdraw their support for Japan during the 1920s 
and 1930s (Beckert 2014, 408). 
The community of Indian merchants and students in Japan never numbered more 
than a few hundred. The 1930 national census recorded 445 Indians living in Japan and 
Comparisons and Deflections 
Cross-Currents 32 | 118 
concentrated mainly in Kobe and Yokohama. 5  Whereas the Yokohama Indian 
community mostly included Hindu Sindhi merchants, owing to their long-standing 
involvement in Yokohama’s silk trade, Kobe’s Indian community was much more diverse, 
with Muslim, Hindu, Parsi, and Jain merchant firms all involved in the Kansai region’s 
cotton trade (Markovits 2000, 146–147). The size of the Indian merchant community, 
however, was disproportionate to its importance to the economies of Kobe and 
Yokohama. When the Great Kanto Earthquake devastated Yokohama in September 1923, 
many Indian merchants decided to relocate to Kobe (see figure 2). Not wanting to let 
Kobe benefit from their presence, the Silk Industry Association of Japan attempted to 
convince the Indian merchants to return to Yokohama by providing incentives and 
assistance to reconstruct their businesses. Despite a generous combined total of 
¥700,000 in aid secured in 1924 and 1925 from the Yokohama city government and the 
Ministry of Finance, these attempts to bring Indian merchants back to Yokohama met 
with limited success. Of the sixty Indian merchant firms based in Yokohama, only 
fourteen returned to the city. By this time, rayon had begun to emerge in Japan as a 
cheaper alternative to silk, and Kobe’s proximity to the major silk- and rayon-producing 
centers of Fukui, Gifu, and Kanazawa provided another incentive for Indian merchants 
leaving Yokohama to restart their businesses in Kobe (Shimizu 2005, 30–32).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. India Water Tower memorial built in 1939 by the Indian Merchants Association of 
Yokohama to recognize the Indians who lost their lives in the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923. 
Source: Author’s collection. 
 
5 Naikaku tōkeikyoku 内閣統計局 [Cabinet statistics bureau],  Shōwa go-nen kokuseichōsa 
hōkoku 昭和 5 年国勢調査報告 [1930 national census report], Tokyo, 1930, p. 135. 
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Indian merchant communities also moved within the Japanese Empire and 
benefited from Japanese colonial institutions. The Bank of Taiwan, for example, was a 
major source of financial support for the activities of Indian merchant firms based in 
Japan that helped extend their networks in China and Southeast Asia, particularly the 
Dutch East Indies (Markovits 2000, 141–142). There is little data on the possible 
presence and activities of Indian merchant communities in Korea, despite the 
importance of cotton cultivation on the Korean peninsula for the Japanese textile 
industry. The Korean Cotton Corporation, established in Osaka in 1906, encouraged 
Korean farmers to grow cotton using American seeds that would then be purchased by 
Japanese agents. This plan aimed to reduce Japan’s dependency on cotton imports from 
India, which on the eve of the annexation of Korea in 1910 amounted to 62 percent of 
Japan’s imported cotton (Beckert 2014, 341). 
 However, as Japan tightened its control over Korea, most of the cotton produced 
in Korea was shipped to textile mills in Kansai. Thus, despite its high productivity in 
cotton cultivation, Korea under colonial rule was actually a net importer of cotton, 
which came mainly from the surplus of Indian cotton in Japan and was inferior in quality 
to the American variety (Eckert 1991, 138–140). It is unclear whether Indian merchants 
played a role in this exchange. During the 1930s, Japanese economic planners hoped to 
significantly expand cotton production in Manchukuo. Nair noted that Manchukuo was 
the residence of about fifteen to twenty Indian families, primarily those of Sindhi 
merchants associated with firms such as Bhoolchand and Dolathram, as well as Tamil 
merchants involved in the jewelry trade (Nair 1982, 97–98). When Sahay visited 
Manchukuo, he also noticed Pathan Muslim watchmen from the frontiers of what is 
now Afghanistan and Pakistan guarding restaurants and entertainment establishments 
even in remote towns bordering the Soviet Union (Sahay 2009, 247). Manchukuo was 
used as a base of operations for Indian merchants involved in the textile trade in 
northern China.  
Despite the importance of Indian merchant networks in selling Japanese textile 
manufactures in Asia and beyond during the 1930s, the Japanese government and the 
large textile firms of Kobe, Osaka, and Yokohama made it clear that they needed to hold 
the reins. They began to exercise tighter control over the activities of Indian merchants. 
Japanese Pan-Asianist and Indian nationalist appeals to Asiatic solidarity and the 
morality behind Japan’s cause were undermined by the racial discrimination 
experienced by members of the Indian community in Japan. Indian merchants were 
indignant at the exclusionary measures taken by Japanese trade associations in Kobe 
and Yokohama that favored Japanese merchants over their Indian counterparts. The 
British consulate in Kobe and the government of India also received numerous 
complaints of racism against Indian merchants and clerks.6 
 
6 National Archives of India (NAI), Persecution of Indians in Japan-A Brief, Government of India, 
Commerce Department. Letter no. 24-C (1)/37 to the Indian Government Trade Commissioner in 
Japan, R. R. Saksena, August 19, 1937. File no. 219-X. 
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Although such Indian activists as Bose and Sahay received considerable support 
from several Indian merchants in Japan, others were more critical of their politics. In his 
autobiography, Sahay admitted that when he first came to Japan in 1923 and began his 
nationalist activism, he found it difficult to attract Indians to his cause. Part of this 
difficulty was due to the concern of coming under the surveillance of British intelligence 
(Sahay 2009, 183). However, some Indians simply did not agree with Sahay’s views on 
Indian nationalism and the Japanese Empire, even though they may have been 
sympathetic to the cause of independence. In May 1931, Nand Lal Kapur approached 
the British Consulate in Kobe to ask for assistance in publishing his critiques of Sahay’s 
articles in the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun. Kapur, who worked at the Canada Manufacture’s 
Insurance Company in Kobe and was a former soldier in the British Indian Army, favored 
greater self-government in India, yet disagreed with Sahay’s platform for Indian 
independence. However, when Kapur approached the editor of the newspaper with an 
article, it was rejected. The editor suggested to Kapur that if he wanted his article to be 
published, he should write in favor of Indian independence along the lines of Sahay. 
Another case involved an Indian Muslim journalist named Abdul Qadir Niaz. 
Arriving in Kobe in June 1935, Niaz was a correspondent for the Amrita Bazar Patrika in 
Calcutta and the Tribune in Lahore. Despite his involvement in socialist movements in 
India, Niaz maintained a good relationship with Sahay and Bose, and he frequently 
discussed politics with Japanese acquaintances interested in Indian affairs.7 However, 
shortly after the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, the Kobe police arrested 
Niaz on the suspicion that he was a British spy. He was detained under harsh conditions 
at the Fukiai police station from October 28 to November 4. Niaz’s interrogators alleged 
that he had contributed anti-Japanese articles to the Indian press, which suggested, 
among other things, that the Japanese military was concealing the true extent of its 
casualties in China. Although Niaz did not hide his criticism of British policies in the 
Middle East, particularly Palestine, his views on British rule in India did not satisfy his 
interrogators. In the end, Niaz was released based on insufficient evidence that he was 
engaged in espionage for Britain. Before releasing him, however, the police required 
Niaz to provide the names of the Japanese acquaintances with whom he had discussed 
the war. This action indicated a concern on the part of the Kobe police that Niaz may 
have been in contact with suspected socialists and communists in Japan. Niaz’s 
relationship with Sahay appears to have soured by this point, since it was Sahay who 
had brought Niaz to the attention of the Kobe police and assured them that he could 
produce Niaz again if the police found it necessary. 8  Although Sahay used his 
considerable influence with the Japanese press and police to push for his specific 
 
7 NAI, Draft Telegram to the Ambassador, Tokyo, November 15, 1937. File no. 493-X. In addition 
to working as a journalist, Niaz was a representative of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in 
Kobe, an Islamic revivalist movement founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in Ludhiana, Punjab, in 
1889. 
8 NAI, Letter to the British Embassy, Tokyo from the British Consul in Kobe, A. R. Ovens, 
November 29, 1937, pp. 1–2. File no. 493-X. 
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nationalist agenda, his views were not universally accepted within the Indian 
community in Japan.9 
Much has been written about the establishment of mosques in Kobe and Tokyo as 
indicative of Japanese appeals to Pan-Islamism to build alliances with the Muslim world 
(Aydin 2007; Esenbel 2011). However, as the case of Niaz shows, members of the Indian 
Muslim community in Kobe had to navigate between the activities of the British and 
Japanese empires as well as those of Bose and Sahay. Mian Abdul Aziz, an Indian Muslim 
from Peshawar and former president of the Muslim League, was invited to give the 
inaugural address at the opening ceremony of the Kobe Mosque in October 1935. In his 
speech, Aziz expressed his hope that the inauguration would promote mutual 
understanding and solidarity between Japan and the Islamic world. However, Aziz 
envisioned that this solidarity would be based on Japan’s adoption of Islam, rather than 
a common struggle against Western imperialism. Instead of Japan’s spiritual and moral 
mission to liberate the colonized world serving as the basis of a future utopian order, 
Aziz held that “the difference between Koba and Kobe will naturally vanish as soon as 
the Rising Moon and the Rising Sun co-operate in shedding light over the whole 
Universe under the auspices of the common Faith, in the Unity of The Almighty Master 
who created this world out of nothing.”10 
Maulvi Aftabuddin Ahmed, an Indian Muslim leader from Lahore and the imam of 
the Woking Mosque in London, was invited to give the first sermon at the Kobe Mosque. 
His sermon expressed similar sentiments as Aziz. In his sermon, Ahmed was more 
concerned with advocating for the wide promotion and acceptance of the Islamic faith 
in Japan than any declarations of anti-imperial solidarity. Interestingly, whereas Hindu 
nationalists such as Bose and Deshpande and conservative secularists such as Sahay 
were convinced of the superiority of Japan’s fusion of modernity and spiritual morality 
over the empires of the West, Ahmed’s sermon asserted that Japan was spiritually 
lacking. The sermon expressed both admiration and criticism of what Ahmed saw as 
Japan’s materialistic society, imploring that Japan’s spiritual deficiency could be resolved 
only if Japan embraced Islam. However, unlike Rabindranath Tagore, who famously 
condemned Japanese imperialism as an acceptance of Western materialism and a 
betrayal of Asia’s spiritual heritage, Ahmed did not go this far in his address.11 
 
9 NA, FO 262/1778, Letter from the British Consul-General, Kobe to His Majesty’s Chargé 
d’Affaires, British Embassy, Tokyo, May 6, 1931. 
10 NA, FO 262/1913, Presidential Address at the Opening Ceremony of the Kobe Mosque, 
October 11, 1935, p. 7. Here, Aziz is referring to the Quba Mosque in Medina, which is reputed to 
be the oldest mosque in the world. 
11 NA, FO 262/1913, The Kobe Muslim Mosque: A Souvenir Booklet Issued in Commemoration of 
the Opening Ceremony of the Kobe Muslim Mosque, October 1935, p. 7. It is unclear whether 
Ahmed gave this sermon personally in Kobe or sent it to be read in his name. Although the 
sermon text strongly hints that Ahmed was in Kobe, his name does not appear in the schedule of 
the opening ceremony.  
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A few years later, when the Kobe Mosque Committee, under the leadership of a 
man named Mr. Rehman, sought to organize a gathering in protest of British policy 
against Arab Muslims in Palestine in October 1938, the committee explicitly barred Bose, 
Sahay, and their Japanese supporters from attending. In response to being excluded, 
Sahay organized his own meeting to protest British policy in Palestine a few days later. 
Indian Muslim leaders in Kobe such as Rehman were deeply suspicious of the efforts of 
Bose and Sahay to bring the mosque’s activism on Asian and Middle Eastern affairs into 
closer alignment with their Pan-Asianist views and support for Japan.12 In the same 
month as the Kobe Mosque’s Palestine protest, Bose announced at the inaugural 
meeting of the Society of Indian Students in Kansai that he would raise funds to build a 
Hindu temple in Kobe.13 Bose hoped that the proposed temple would serve the needs of 
Hindus throughout Japan; however, some within the Indian community suspected that 
Bose’s plan was fueled in large part by resentment stemming from the recent election of 
Abul Kasem Fazlul Huq as Chief Minister in Bengal in India’s first provincial elections in 
1937.14 Huq was not only a leading member of the Muslim League, but he was 
instrumental in presenting the Lahore Resolution calling for the creation of Pakistan as 
an independent nation-state for India’s Muslims. Bose envisioned that the proposed 
Hindu temple would assert, in a muscular nationalist sense, the Hindu presence on the 
religious landscape of Kobe, specifically against the Kobe Mosque.  
Bose gained considerable financial backing for the temple from within the Indian 
merchant and student communities as well as his Japanese supporters. Eventually, 
however, due to protests both from Sahay who felt that Bose was encroaching on his 
territory and from members of the Indian community in Kobe, the plan to construct the 
temple was abandoned on the grounds that it would incite religious tension. Bose used 
the money he received to inaugurate a new Hindu temple—the Bharat Mandir (India 
temple)—which British intelligence described as being housed in “unimpressive 
premises.” 15  The temple’s ceremonies reflected the close ties between Hindu 
nationalism and Japanese Pan-Asian ideals, as evident in a ceremony held in the temple 
on January 22, 1939 to honor and pray for the spirits of Japanese soldiers who died 
during the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937.16 For many Indian Muslims in Japan, 
Japanese appeals to Pan-Islamist sentiment therefore seemed disingenuous when Pan-
Asianists in Japan were simultaneously supporting activists affiliated with the Hindu 
Mahasabha and the INC, especially at a time when both organizations were hostile to 
the Muslim League.  
 
12 NA, FO 262/1969, Letter from the British Consulate-General, Osaka to His Excellency the Right 
Honorable Sir Robert Craigie, Tokyo, October 18, 1938, pp. 10–11. 
13 NA, FO 262/1969, Letter from the British Consulate-General, Osaka to His Excellency the Right 
Honorable Sir Robert Craigie, Tokyo, October 18, 1938, p. 9.  
14 NA, FO 262/1969, Minutes, September 12, 1938. 
15 IOR, L/P&J/12/480, Letter from the British Consulate, Kobe, January 30, 1939, p. 241. 
16 IOR, L/P&J/12/480, Letter from the British Consulate, Kobe, January 30, 1939, pp. 239–241. 
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Members of the Indian community in Japan were wary about Bose and Sahay for 
not only their politics but also their use of their connections with the Japanese police to 
harass and, in a few cases, deport Indian merchants who were unwilling to support their 
nationalist activism or otherwise wronged them personally. Take, for example, the case 
of Sahay and an Indian merchant named Attar Sain Jain. When Jain arrived in Japan in 
1926, he was employed by the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages as a Hindi instructor. 
In the spring of 1929, Jain moved to Kobe where he took up a position at the Osaka 
School of Foreign Languages and opened a grocery business. He even donated ten cases 
of Indian curry powder to Kwantung Army soldiers stationed in Manchukuo.17 Jain ran 
the grocery with his Japanese mistress, Okamoto Hisako. 
When Jain’s Indian wife arrived in Japan along with their three children in the 
spring of 1935 and found out about her husband’s relationship with Okamoto, she was 
livid. She sought assistance from the Sannomiya police, who suggested that Sahay act as 
a mediator to settle the dispute. This was not the first time that Jain encountered Sahay. 
At some point, Sahay had borrowed money from Jain, but when Jain pressed for 
repayment of the loan, Sahay was recalcitrant. Now that Jain was caught up in a marital 
dispute, Sahay saw this as a chance to settle an old score. Using his connections with the 
Japanese police and press, Sahay organized a smear campaign against Jain, portraying 
him as a womanizing and unscrupulous businessman who frequently defaulted on his 
rent. By September 1936, Jain, his wife, and their children were arrested and 
deported.18 Sahay also orchestrated the deportation of Nand Lal Kapur, the Indian 
resident of Kobe who tried to publish his critiques of Sahay’s nationalist views in the 
Osaka Mainichi Shinbun in 1931, by convincing the Japanese police that Kapur earned 
his living through “habitual malpractice” and was secretly engaged in espionage as a 
British spy.19 Reduced to destitution, Kapur was forced to leave behind his pregnant 
Japanese wife.20  
According to Jain, there were numerous instances of Indians being harassed by the 
Japanese police. However, many Indians were unwilling to report these cases, partly 
because they had little confidence that the British Indian government would stand up 
for them and partly because they feared that the Japanese police would suspect them 
further if they approached the British consulate.21 In a tragic case of violence directed 
against Indian merchants, the Japanese consular police arrested Ibraham Abdullah 
Hussain, an Indian Muslim merchant dealing in precious stones from Bombay, on June 
17, 1936 in Hsinking, Manchukuo, along with his Sudanese wife and son under suspicion 
 
17 NAI, Statement of A. S. Jain, March 15, 1937, p. 7. File no. 219-X. 
18 NAI, Statement of A. S. Jain, March 15, 1937, pp. 1–7. File no. 219-X. 
19 NAI, Letter from A. R. Ovens, British Consulate, Kobe to J. L. Dodds, Esquire, Chargé d’Affaires 
ad Interim, May 22, 1937, p. 2. File no. 219-X. 
20 NAI, Letter from A. S. Jain to K. P. S. Menon, Esquire, Additional Deputy Secretary (Foreign), 
Foreign and Political Department, Government of India, April 1, 1937, p. 1. File no. 219-X. 
21 NAI, Letter from A. S. Jain to K. P. S. Menon, Esquire, Additional Deputy Secretary (Foreign), 
Foreign and Political Department, Government of India, April 1, 1937, p. 1. File no. 219-X. 
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of defrauding three Japanese shops. The family was brutally tortured in custody. When 
British consular authorities in Mukden intervened, they confirmed that the family had 
indeed been tortured and expressed disbelief when Japanese police officials claimed 
that Hussain had received his injuries in a motor accident in Harbin.22 Although the 
British consul-general in Mukden concluded that the family’s reasons for being in 
Manchukuo may have been unsatisfactory, it was clear that they were forced to sign 
statements in Japanese, which none of the family members understood, and admit to 
their guilt under duress.23 This case reveals that the celebration of Manchukuo as a 
model of racial harmony and the way forward for Asia by both Japanese Pan-Asianists 
and some Indian nationalists rang false against the reality of Japanese imperial violence. 
A 1940 report from the research division of the Manchukuo Central Bank reveals that 
Japanese attempts to appeal to Indian merchants in East Asia were largely a failure. 
Indian sympathies remained firmly with the Chinese and the Guomindang. The report 
suggested that unless Japanese policy underwent a significant change toward Indian 
merchants, a combined Chinese and Indian boycott of Japanese goods would be 
devastating to Japanese economic interests in the region (Manshūkoku chūō ginkō 
chōsaka 1940, 12–15). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The attempts of Pan-Asianist and Buddhist leaders to promote solidarity between Japan 
and the Indian nationalist movement during the 1930s were part of an effort to create a 
new political economic order in Asia that would challenge both the liberal 
internationalism of the League of Nations and the socialist internationalism of the 
Comintern. These efforts would later come to form in official discourse during the Asia-
Pacific War as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan’s empire of client 
states that began with the creation of Manchukuo in February 1932. Japanese 
commentators utilized readings and misreadings of the Indian past and its 
independence struggle, filtered through a politics of comparison with the British Empire, 
to advocate for domestic reform so that Japan would be spiritually and morally 
equipped to assume political and economic leadership over Asia and the colonized 
world. Indian nationalists sympathetic to Japan also used the politics of comparison to 
read and misread the Japanese Empire as morally superior to the British Empire in 
elucidating their own visions for a postcolonial India and, more broadly, Asia, as well as 
critiquing socialist trends within the mainstream nationalist movement in India. 
However, such misreadings and comparisons proved to be disastrous for Japanese 
Pan-Asianists as well as their Indian supporters. The insistence of Japanese Pan-Asianist 
and Buddhist commentators in locating “authentic” Indian nationalism in movements 
that they interpreted as being dependent on Hindu spirituality, such as the 
noncooperation movement of Gandhi and the militant nationalism of the Hindu 
 
22 NA, FO 262/1942, Telegram from Mukden to Tokyo, June 27, 1936. 
23 NA, FO 262/1942, Telegram from Mukden to Tokyo, July 6, 1936.  
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Mahasabha, undermined their appeals to Indian Muslims through Pan-Islamism at a 
time when Hindu-Muslim tensions were at an all-time high. The willingness of Indian 
nationalists such as Bose, Sahay, and Nair to ignore or gloss over the reality of Japanese 
imperialism in Asia and its own economic exploitation of India isolated them from the 
mainstream Indian nationalist movement, which moved sharply toward the left during 
the 1930s and adopted a critical stance toward fascism. Members of the Indian 
community in Japan, whose networks and wealth Japanese Pan-Asianists and Indian 
nationalists hoped to mobilize, found themselves in a conflicted and tenuous position. 
As much as Indian merchants and other members of the diaspora benefited from the 
support and mobility provided by the Japanese Empire, they were also its victims, as 
their place within the political economy envisioned by Japan’s Pan-Asian ideologues and 
Indian activists depended on their acquiescence to a particular articulation of national 
and transnational community.  
Through an analysis of the encounters between Japanese Pan-Asianists, Indian 
nationalists, and the Indian diaspora, the discourse of civilization and comparisons—
whether invoked by the colonizer or the colonized—can be used to ascribe moral 
legitimacy to specific imperial and national projects. When such comparisons are drawn, 
they can produce entanglements and deflections that obscure the violence committed 
in the name of empire and nation. This is not to suggest that all comparisons produce 
problematic entanglements, for some comparisons can give birth to genuine and 
constructive solidarities. However, in highlighting the case of the interactions between 
Japan and the Indian diaspora during the 1930s, this articles draws attention to the 
limitations of civilizational discourse invoked through the lens of authenticity and the 
nation-state, as well as the importance of being conscious of the politics behind 
comparison and aware of the perils that comparisons often entail.  
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